Strategies For Controlling Inflation



Inflation, which is defined by Frederic Mishkin (2007) as the condition of a continually and rapidly rising price level is similar in some sense as water is to human beings. Too much water (hyperinflation) causes massive floods while the lack of water or the absence of water (deflation) causes droughts. What is required is a steady and constant supply of water which central banks commonly refer to as low and stable inflation. Frederic Mishkin (2000) stated that price stability (which is obtained through a low and stable inflation) should be the overriding, long-run goal of monetary policy. Knowing this to be true, the understanding of the various strategies that central banks can use to control inflation becomes of outmost importance for modern economists. This working paper would have achieved its purpose should it successfully give an equal argument on the advantages and disadvantages of each policy (as written by Frederic Mishkin’s 1997 working paper) and also to highlight some of the inflationary challenges that we shall all face in the coming years.


Literature Review

Winston Churchill once said: “that the further backward you look the further forward you can see”. World War II (1939-1945) the largest and costliest war in terms of men and money is seldom linked to inflation.[1] Yet a brief walk back through time brings us to the situation in Europe during 1918 when the cost of World War I had forced belligerent nations to ‘print money’ not backed by productive wealth.[2] In doing so, the governments of Europe made money in circulation worth less and the people suffered because of the reduction in their purchasing power and the lost in their real wealth. Among the nations involved, Germany stands out as the German government printed huge amounts of currency that made the German mark collapse and setting the stage for Adolf Hitler’s assent to power.[3] The German government itself did not encourage inflation but wanted to avoid a post war (World War I) recession, revive its industrial capacity, and create high employment. However, the printing of money led to the German economy spinning out of control and into the dreaded horrors of hyperinflation.

I am not saying that the sole cause of World War II was inflation but one can see the sequence and chain of events of how high inflation (through the printing of money) led to incontrollable hyperinflation which in turn cause worldwide financial and political instability that resulted in the horrors man experienced in World War II. Clearly inflation is a force to be reckoned with and this example alone should be enough to justify the importance of knowing the strategies central banks can use to combat and control inflation. However, is not inflation and World War II a relic of the past? Have not the central banks across the globe (especially in the United Stated) proven their ability and their credibility to keep inflation at bay while at the same time promoting economic growth? Even Frederic Mishkin (1997) stated that inflation has fallen dramatically in many industrialized as well as emerging countries reaching a point where many of them arguably regarded as price stability.

A recent interview with legendary ex- Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan, stated that the end of the cold war, globalization, the rise of China and the rampant spread of information technology were huge disinflationary forces that helped economic growth, high productivity, and booming markets.[4] However, the time of bliss might soon come to an end as the rate of foreign workers might start to slow while China’s wage-rate growth may start to mount hinting the inevitable rise of exports from China (export prices from China rose in spring 2007 for the first time in years).[5] All these events will spark a rise in inflation and more importantly expectations of inflation that may disrupt price stability in the future. Furthermore, the consumer price index (CPI) which is commonly used as a measure of inflation might not be accurate. The calculations of the CPI may be highly distorted because it is the average price of goods and services purchased by households when the inflation may be in products that people cannot live without (fuel and food).

Furthermore, another reason the CPI looks so reasonable is due to the The Moore’s Law, a prediction that in every two years there will be an increase in computing power and a decrease in cost.[6] This is reinforced by the fact that cost of optional purchase like computers, televisions and other electronics dropped about 50% in recent years. [7] All these factors and findings supports the fact that price stability remains an issue in the 21st Century and that the strategies of controlling inflation continues to remain of outmost importance to central banks across the globe.



The working paper that is the subject of today’s study and review is the ‘Strategies for Controlling Inflation’ as written by Frederic S. Mishkin in 1997. The working paper by Mr Mishkin was prepared for the Reserve Bank of Australia’s 1997 Conference on Monetary Policy and Inflation Targeting. The main agenda of this research paper is to examine how central banks across the globe set monetary policy in order to control inflation to achieve price stability. This working paper also suggests ways in which the gains in lowering inflation can be maintained.

The first part of the working paper is centered upon the growing consensus for price stability among central bankers. There are two reasons why inflation is given such a high priority. First, activist monetary policy that aims to reduce unemployment in the short run might not be achievable. Second, price stability leads to higher economic growth and output in the long run. According to Milton Friedman, activist monetary policy that is used to reduce unemployment in the short run might not be achievable because of long and variable lags in the economy. This might cause overly expansionary monetary policy that will eventually lead to an overheating economy. Besides that, it is now known that there is no trade off between unemployment and inflation. This was because the Philips curve analysis left out an important factor affecting wages and price inflation namely the expectation of inflation. Therefore unemployment cannot be continually increased with higher inflation. Furthermore, the time-inconsistency problem also poses a challenge to activist monetary policy as economic behavior is affected by expectations of future monetary policy. This will in turn result in higher inflation with no increase in output after a certain level.

The next part of the working paper attempts to prove the importance of price stability as a long term goal for monetary policy. The reason for this is because price stability helps the economic system to run more smoothly and efficiently. There are many costs that inflation will give the economy. The first cost is the ‘shoe leather cost’ of inflation whereby it requires huge and ever increasing amounts of cash to conduct transactions. Besides that, another cost of inflation is the difficulty to form decisions about future expenditures. Higher inflation increases the uncertainty of prices that will hamper production of goods and services. Inflation also becomes a tax like system as a rise in inflation increases the cost of capital which lowers investments below its optimal level.

The first strategy outlined in Mishkin’s working paper is the exchange rate peg which is done by pegging a country’s currency with the anchor currency of another larger country with low inflation. This is done in hope that the country’s inflation level will slowly adjust to the anchor currency’s country. Another variation of the exchange rate pegging involves a crawling peg or target so that the country’s currency is allowed to depreciate at a steady rate. The advantage of the exchange rate pegging strategy is that it provides a nominal anchor so as to help overcome the time-inconsistency problem. With a strong commitment to the exchange rate peg, this strategy forms an automatic monetary rule that forces the tightening or loosening of monetary policy. Besides that, the exchange rate peg is simple, clear, and easily understood by the public. Furthermore, an exchange rate peg helps to quickly bring down inflation levels to those of the targeted country.

However, there are a many disadvantages of exchange rate pegging. First, is the loss of independent monetary policy for the country adopting the exchange rate peg. Second, any inflationary pressures to the anchor country would be transmitted to the targeting country. Third, the exchange rate peg might leave countries open to speculative attacks on their currencies. Fourth, in emerging countries, exchange rate pegs might trigger a full scale financial crisis and severe economic contractions. Worse still is the possibility of increased inflation after a speculative attack that defeats the purpose of the exchange rate peg as a strategy to control inflation.

The second strategy used to combat inflation is monetary targeting. Some countries are too large and there are no countries for them to anchor their currency to. Milton Friedman suggested for a constant money-growth-rate rule whereby a monetary aggregate for example, M2, is targeted to grow at a constant rate. The advantage of monetary targeting is that it gives to the central bank the discretion and ability to adjust its monetary policy to suit domestic considerations. This strategy is similar to the exchange rate peg in certain ways by providing an easily understood nominal anchor to the public and also promoting the accountability of the central bank to keep inflation low so as to eliminate the time-inconsistency problem.

There are also disadvantages through the adoption of monetary targeting. The greatest drawback is that the strategy is centered upon the assumption of a strong and reliable relationship between the goal variable (inflation target) and the targeted variable (monetary growth target). Should there be a weak relationship between the variables, achieving the targeted monetary growth would not result in the desired outcome because it will not provide a clear signal to the stance of monetary policy. The second disadvantage is that the targeted monetary aggregate must be controlled properly by the central bank. Should this fail, the monetary aggregate would not give a clear signal about the intentions of the central bank and make them less accountable (especially in the case of M2 and M3).

The third strategy to control inflation is through inflation targeting which is done through a public announcement of medium term numerical targets for inflation with a commitment by monetary authorities to achieve these targets. The main advantages of inflation targeting include the increased accountability of the central bank to achieve its inflation target and with that eliminating to a certain extent the time-inconsistency problem. Furthermore, inflation targeting does not require a stable money-inflation relationship thereby giving the central bank full flexibility in setting the best domestic monetary policy.

Inflation targeting also has weaknesses as inflation is not as easily controlled compared to exchange rates and monetary aggregates. Going deeper into the subject, long lags in monetary policy also causes inflation outcomes to occur after a longer period of time thereby making inflation targets not an immediate signal to the public and market on the stance of monetary policy. Besides that, inflation targeting is argued to give central banks too little discretion to respond to unforeseen circumstances. More importantly however, is that inflation targeting may lead to larger output fluctuations and increased unemployment in order to achieve price stability. Other arguments against inflation targeting include GDP targeting (however the argument against GDP targeting is also strong).

The last strategy used by central banks to control inflation is the ‘just do it’ or preemptive monetary policy without an explicit nominal anchor. This policy is unique because it does not require an explicit nominal anchor like exchange rates, monetary aggregate, or an inflation target. Instead this strategy focuses on preemptive strikes against inflation. This policy is known for bringing and maintaining a low inflation in the United States through the leadership of Federal Reserve Chairman, Alan Greenspan. By giving the central bank more discretion, this policy solves the economic problem by adopting a forward-looking behavior.

Some of the disadvantages of the ‘just do it’ strategy is its lack of transparency which may cause financial and economic uncertainty. Furthermore, because of the absence of an explicit nominal anchor, the central bank is less accountable and therefore vulnerable to the time-inconsistency problem. This will in turn cause the leadership of the central bank to be of huge importance as they will have more freedom to pursue the monetary policy they choose. Moreover, politicians may be able to put pressure on the central bank to pursue favorable policies for short term benefits.



Frederic Mishkin has highlighted four common strategies used by central banks to control inflation. To further study and discuss on these four strategies, we must first discuss some of the basic requirements that these strategies must solve in order for them to be viable and feasible from an economic point of view. Fortunately, Frederic Mishkin (2000) has written on some of the guiding principles for central banks[8]. Among them include the attainment of price stability which is seen to be a long-run goal for a number of central banks today. This is because price stability encourages healthy economic growth by lowering uncertainty, information distortion, and preventing overinvestment in the financial sector (to escape inflation). A strategy to control inflation must also be able to avoid the trap of time-inconsistency whereby short run ‘gains’ (employment and higher economic output) might bring long run ‘pains’ (inflation). Besides that, monetary policy should be forward looking. This is because they are time lags and price stickiness that may delay the effects of monetary policy. The next criterion is accountability and transparency that will force central banks to be responsible and to also serve as a benchmark of performance. Furthermore, any strategy to control inflation must also take into account their effects on economic output as this variable is also important to an economy’s well-being. Lastly, the flexibility and independence of central banks must also be present as empirical evidence shows us that independent central banks tend to perform better than their counterparts.

Exchange Rate Pegging

When a country’s exchange rate is fixed, its interest rate and inflation is determined by the monetary policy in the country to whose currency the exchange rate has been pegged (Stephen Cecchetti, 2006, page 569). Should the inflation levels of the country being used as the anchor currency is low, the inflation levels of the country using the exchange rate peg would slowly lower and run parallel to the anchor country. The argument in favor of the exchange rate peg seems weak even though this strategy forms a good and solid nominal anchor to solve the time inconsistency, transparency and accountability problem of the central bank. The major drawback to this strategy is that the central bank loses its independence in setting monetary policy and cannot be forward looking as they are forced to follow the monetary policy of the anchor country. This will cripple the central bank to respond to output fluctuations and disruptions that might seriously hamper economic growth. Furthermore, exchange rate pegs have a history of being successful only in the short run.

The United Kingdom before its adoption of inflation targeting used exchange rate targeting to a great success. In 1992, the United Kingdom managed to lower its inflation rate from 10% to 3% in the 1990s.[9] The ripple effects from the German Reunification in 1990 (the cost of rebuilding Eastern Germany) created inflationary pressures that forced the Bundesbank to raise interest rates. Because the British pound was pegged to the German mark, an interest parity condition occurred. The interest parity condition, states that the domestic interest rate equals the foreign interest rate minus the expected appreciation of the domestic currency (Mishkin, 2007 p.441). The rise in German interest rates meant that either England raises its interest rates or lets its currency depreciate.

Speculators like George Soros knew for certain that the British pound would depreciate (the British were facing a recession) and started short selling the pound (and purchasing the mark). Whatever the Bank of England lost, were the profits of speculators like George Soros who became known as the man who broke the Bank of England. Extreme commitments to exchange rate pegs seem to fare even worst. In April 1991, Argentina decided to use a currency board whereby 1 USD is redeemable for 1 Peso. During the early years, Argentina’s currency board outperformed any other inflation controlling strategy with inflation plunging from 800% to 5%[10] (Frederic Mishkin, 2007 p486). However, the currency board crippled Argentina’s control over monetary policy and was left at the mercy of economic output fluctuations (like those caused by the Mexican peso crisis). In 2002, the currency board collapsed and the peso depreciated more than 70% resulting in high inflation, a full scale financial crisis, and a severe depression.

The bottom line is exchange rate pegs might work extremely well in the short run but this will be at the expense of economic stability in the long run. The problem is which countries are able to apply it in question. Economically strong countries like the United States would be unable to find any other country’s currency to anchor to. Emerging countries like third world countries with high growth may pay dearly for sacrificing monetary policy independence over the short term gain of controlling inflation. Should a country decide to adopt it nonetheless, another question that arises is the commitment towards the exchange rate peg. Weak commitment would induce speculative attacks while strong commitments (like those of the currency board) may prove to be a long run monetary disaster. Furthermore, monetary policy of the anchor country might have adverse effects on the country practicing exchange rate pegs. And as we all know, central banks do make mistakes.

Monetary Targeting

Milton Friedman quoted that “inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon.”[11] Friedman suggested monetary targeting by adopting a constant-money-growth rate rule whereby the central bank would expand the money supply each year at the same annual rate as the typical growth of the economy’s production capacity.[12] The implementation of such a rule would eliminate the major cause of instability in the economy by providing liquidity that will cause aggregate demand and economic output to increase steadily. In reality however, no monetary targeting central bank has followed the rule laid down by Milton Friedman.

We will take Germany as the prime example of monetary targeting because the Bundesbank managed to achieve low inflation with its monetary targeting regime. One key aspect to be noted is that Germany’s monetary targeting regime did not follow Milton Friedman’s rule of a constant growth monetary aggregate. Ironically, the Bundesbank often misses its own monetary aggregate targets in favor of being flexible and responsive to any fluctuations in economic output and exchange rates. This decreases the credibility of the central bank as the public has lesser confidence that the monetary target would be reached.

From the example of Germany’s monetary targeting regime, we find that monetary targeting can achieve low inflation and with that price stability at the cost of occasional misses in its monetary aggregate targets. This strategy scores high for forward looking, independence, flexibility, and transparency but sacrifices accountability, and vulnerability to the time inconsistency problem (setting a target and not achieving it would not impress anybody). In terms of long run economic growth, the United States has abandoned this policy while Japan did not seem to be successful either and thereby hinting us that there are other more successful methods of gaining long run economic growth.

One of the major problems about monetary targeting is that it relies heavily on a strong relationship between monetary aggregates and inflation rates as shown in the diagram above (Link #2). A strong relationship between the two variables may not be guaranteed (like seen in the United States). Should this happen, the monetary aggregate target will be worthless as an indicator of the performance of the economy and the central bank.

Inflation Targeting

Inflation targeting has recently become very popular among central banks. Its various advantages (compared to other strategies) cannot be discounted. Inflation targeting makes a solid and firm commitment towards price stability which in one fell strike answers to price stability as a long-term goal, counters the time-inconsistency problem, and makes central banks both accountable and highly transparent. Some economists however argue that inflation targeting is too rigid and thereby limiting the ability of the central banks to be independent and forward looking.

Also taken into consideration is that inflation targeting might overemphasize the goal of price stability and may neglect economic output as another major goal of monetary policy. Much credit has however been given to inflation targeting as the ideal monetary policy strategy against inflation as countries adopting this strategy have achieved both lower inflation and higher real growth[i]. Countries that have adopted this strategy (United Kingdom, Canada, and New Zealand) are seen to achieve remarkable results in terms of controlling inflation.

However, do achieving inflation targets fulfill the long run goal of price stability? On paper this might look to be true as figures representing inflation like those of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) might show low inflation. However as I have mentioned in the literature review, inflation is present in consumer goods and services that we cannot possibly live without mainly fuel and food. Because the CPI is an average of all goods and services in a common household, other goods and services which are decreasing in price (we can live without a new TV or computer) and optional will distort the CPI. If this proves to be true, then achieving the inflation target might not mean price stability.

Just Do It

Alan Greenspan has become an oracle to many people in the world by achieving extraordinary economic results through adopting an implicit nominal anchor. Focusing on preemptive strikes (prevention is better than cure), the ‘just do it’ policy attempts to kill inflation expectation before it builds up enough momentum to cause inflationary pressures. The rationale of this is because monetary policy effects have long lags.[13] Because of this, monetary policy should be forward looking to be able to anticipate the effect of current actions upon the future economic situation.

The ‘just do it’ policy is proven to be forward looking, being able to achieve economic growth, and to be very flexible in conducting monetary policy to combat inflation. This is shown when the Federal Reserve of the United States responded by cutting the federal funds rate after the September 11 terrorist attacks and the adverse impact of the Enron Scandal (Frederic Mishkin, 2004, p.1). What is lacking in the ‘just do it’ policy is transparency, and accountability. Furthermore, Alan Greenspan has practically become the nominal anchor in the eyes of the public. After Alan Greenspan is no longer chairman of the Federal Reserve, there is no guarantee that the new person in office would continue to adhere to the dual mandate of price stability and output stability.


The Solution

Frederic Mishkin (1997) has enlightened us by introducing four common strategies central banks use to control inflation (and in some cases deflation). The exchange rate peg seems to sacrifice long term economic prosperity over short term gains on inflation. Monetary targeting on the other hand works when central banks (Bundesbank) miss their target (for the benefit of countering any adverse economic fluctuations) making the credibility and accountability of central banks low. Inflation targeting through highly successful may prove too rigid (overemphasis on inflation levels). Finally the ‘just do it’ policy depends too much on a certain individuals in charge of the central bank. Given the arguments on the advantages and disadvantages of the various strategies, one must come out with a framework on which strategy is most appropriate to be used by central banks across the globe.

Fortunately, Frederic Mishkin (2000) has come out with the criteria for what central banks should do. First, price stability should continue being the long-run goal of central banks as the benefits of achieving it is irreplaceable. Second, an explicit nominal anchor should be adopted as this can be used to solve the time-inconsistency problem and increase the accountability of central banks. Third, central banks should be goal independent and instrument independent so as to be able to react to adverse fluctuations in output, economic activities, and at the same time being able to conduct monetary policy without any disturbance of the short run needs of politicians.

Based on the requirements above, inflation targeting seems to be the best choice. However, inflation targeting may lack the flexibility needed to respond against adverse affects on economic output shocks (overemphasis on inflation). The solution to this is to adopt a hybrid of inflation targeting and the ‘just do it’ policy or forward looking inflation targeting. History has shown us that supply shocks and financial instability may build inflationary pressures.[ii] Central banks must therefore retain their flexibility and independence seen in the ‘just do it’ strategy to provide monetary policy that are countercyclical against adverse economic situations. On the other hand, central banks with an explicit nominal anchor will be more accountable and transparent towards the public thereby forcing the central banks to perform well and responsibly.

The arguments in support of this hybrid strategy are overwhelmingly strong. Central banks cannot sustain the permanent growth in economy and to achieve high employment by continuous expansionary monetary policy. The Philips curve that shows that higher inflation came with lower unemployment was only in the short run with Milton Friedman (1976) pointing out that this trade-off was only temporary. On the other hand, high inflation and high unemployment the phenomenon of stagflation is dangerously possible and must be avoided by central banks at all cost. Central banks across the world must understand that we cannot spend our way into continuous economic growth at the price of high inflation. As Milton Friedman once said, “there is no such thing as a free lunch.”



The Great Inflation of the late 1970s gave way to an age of low, and steady inflation thanks in part to the skill with which central banks learnt to steer monetary policy.[14] The current age of low and steady inflation in industrialized countries might not last forever.[iii] Exchange rate imbalances (like those of the USD being overvalued and the Yuan being undervalued) coupled with financial globalization has killed inflationary pressures by providing first world countries with cheap imports and labor from third world countries. As foreign direct investments continue to flow into China and India[iv] (creating inflationary pressures there), it is only a matter of time when this ‘happy hour’ comes to an end. Furthermore, the shrinking middle class and low birth rates of industrialized countries might lead to a death loop by people spending more than they earn, borrowing more than they can afford and governments indirectly printing more money to solve budget deficits.[15] In an age that Alan Greenspan coined as the ‘Age of Turbulence’, economists must never underestimate the destructive power of high inflation.



Ø Campbell R. Mc Connell & Stanley L. Brue. 2008. “Economics.” Mc Graw Hill. p.134.

Ø Donald J. Trump & Robert T. Kiyosaki. 2006. “Why We Want You To Be Rich.” Rich Press, Rich Publishing. p.75-76.

Ø Frederic S. Mishkin. 1997. “Strategies For Contolling Inflation.” National Bureau of Economic Research. p.1-32.

Ø Frederic S. Mishkin. 2000. “What Should Central Banks Do?” National Bureau of Economic Research. p.1-5, 6-8, 11-14, 16-17, 19.

Ø Frederic S. Mishkin. 2004. “Why The Federal Reserve Should Adopt Inflation Targeting.” National Bureau of Economic Research & Columbia University. p.1, 4-6.

Ø Frederic S. Mishkin. 2007. “The Economics of Money, Banking, and Financial Markets.” Pearson Education Inc. p.613-637, 52.

Ø Gary B. Nash & Julie Roy Jeffrey. 1990. “The American People-Volume 2.” Harper Collins. p.971-976.

Ø Gary B. Shelly, Thomas J. Cashman, Misty E. Vermaat. 2005. “Discovering Computers.” Thomson Learning. p.193, 219.

Ø Mark Kishlansky, Patrick Geary, & Patricia O’Brien. 1995. “Civilization of the West.” Harper Collins. p.852-854, 871-872, 944.

Ø Milton Friedman. 1977. “Nobel Lecture: Inflation and Unemployment.” Journal of Political Economy. p.270, 272, 280.

Ø Stephen G. Cecchetti. 2006. “Money, Banking, and Financial Markets.” Mc Graw Hill. p.7, 24, 519.

Ø Barrett Sheridan. 2007. “Heady Days.” Newsweek: Access: 15 December 2007, 3.00 PM

Ø Christopher Dickey. 2007. “Let Them Eat Cake.” Newsweek: Access: 13 December 2007, 5.00 PM

Ø Fred Kaifosh. “The Consumer Price Index Controversy.” Obtained at: Access: 20 December 2007, 7.00 PM

Ø Ruchir Sharma. 2007. “Stand Clear of the Closing Doors.” Newsweek: Access: 25 December 2007, 5.55 PM

Ø The Economist. October 20th-26th 2007. “Only Human.” p.3-4.

Ø The Economist. October 20th-26th 2007. “Heroes of the Zeroes.” p.8-12.

Ø The Economist. June 30th-July 6th 2007. “Food.” p.101.

Ø The Economist. March 5th-11th 2007. “The Insidious Charms of Foreign Investment.” p.9-13.

Ø The Economist. February 26th-March 4th 2007. “Are central banks watching the wrong measure of inflation?.” p.72.

Ø The Economist. October 20th-26th 2007. “Only Human.” p.3-4.

Ø Newsweek. September 24, 2007. “The Greenspan Gospel.” p.17-21.

Ø Newsweek. September 24, 2007. “The Oracle Reveals All.” p.22-23.

[2] Mark Kishlansky, Patrick Geary & Patricia O’ Brien, 1995, p.852-853

[3] Mark Kishlansky, Patrick Geary & Patricia O’ Brien, 1995, p.852-853

[4] Daniel Gross, Newsweek, The Greenspan Gospel, 24 September, 2007

[5] Daniel Gross, Newsweek, The World in 2030, 24 September, 2007

[6] Gary B. Shelly, Thomas J. Cashman, Misty E. Vermaat, 2005. Discovering Computers, Thomson Learning

[7] Christopher Dickey, Let Them Eat Cake, Newsweek:

[8] Frederic S. Mishkin, 2000, What Should Central Banks Do? National Bureau of Economic Research.

[9] Frederic S. Mishkin, 2007

[10] Frederic S. Mishkin, 2007

[11] Frederic Mishkin, 2007, p.613

[12] Campbell McConnell & Stanley Brue, 2008, p.330

[13] Milton Friedman, 1976, p.271

[14] The Economist, A Special Report on Central Banks and World Economy, Only Human, October 20th-26th, p.4

[15] Donald J. Trump & Robert T. Kiyosaki, Why We Want You to be Rich, 2006

2 Responses to “Strategies For Controlling Inflation”
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